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NOTES
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SETS OF THE BANK IN INSoLVENCY.-At common law directors of a

bank are not individually liable to the depositors merely on account
of their assent to the receipt of deposits with the knowledge that the
bank was insolvent.1 A violation of the director's duty to the bank
gives rise to no cause of action in favor of the depositors and any cause
of action which the depositors may have must be based upon some
violation of a duty owing them by the directors. 2 "Neither, in the
absence of a special statute, are the directors of a bank liable to a
general depositor for mismanaging the affairs of the bank so that
his debt is lost, for unless they are made liable by statute, the breach
of duty of which they have been guilty is to the bank and not to its
customers . . . . directors of a bank may make themselves .liable to
ordinary depositors in damages, for false and fraudulent representations made by them, whereby the depositors have suffered loss." 3
"'As a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation are not
trustees of the corporate creditors and are not liable to them for
negligence or mismanagement of the company's business, resulting in
its insolvency, unless made so by charter or statute.' "4 However,
where the director in violation of the laws of the state pertaining to
banks and banking permits deposits to be made knowing the bank
is in failing circumstances or insolvent he is individually liable to the
depositors. By reason of such violation of the laws the depositors
have a cause of action against the directors to the extent of the damages suffered. 5
No contractual relation exists between the depositors and the directors. The depositor's contract is with the bank in its separate capacity as an entity. There is no implied contract between the depositors
and the directors as individuals for the directors are merely agents of
the bank. There is a division of opinion as to whether the directors
bear the relation of trustees to the depositors. In Daniels v. Berry 6
1 Ellitt v. Newland, 132 So. 763 (La. 1931).
2
3
4
5
6

Daniels v. Berry, 146 S. E. 420 (S. C. 1929).
3 THoiuasoN, CommaaETARiEs oN THE LAw or CopRoaATIoNs, § 4138.
Op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 422.
Paris v. Beckner, 289 Pac. 276 (Okla. 1930).
Op. dt. supra note 2.
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it was said that the better view seems to be that the directors are
not such trustees. "Depositors do not deal with the directors but with
the bank itself, and the relationship between them and the bank is that
of debtor and creditor; under these conditions we cannot see how
there could arise any such relationship between the directors who are
merely agents of the bank and the depositors as would create the former trustees of the funds the latter placed on deposit in the bank." 7
When a bank becomes insolvent it should refuse to accept deposits
and should discontinue the doing of business. If it continues to do
business and accepts a deposit, it will commit a fraud upon the depositor, for title to the deposit remains in the depositor. The depositor
"may follow and recover it, if it augmented the assets of the bank and
can be identified." 8 The money must not be mingled with the assets
of the bank. Where the failure of the bank is imminent and the possibility of obtaining necessary money to meet its obligation is too
doubtful, then the bank is not justified in mingling the deposits made
at that time with money in the bank's vault. 9 Where an officer of
the bank by misrepresentation induces a depositor not to withdraw
his deposit when he knows of the failing condition or insolvency of the
bank and had the depositor known that such was the condition of the
bank would not have left his money on deposit, this constitutes a fraud
upon the depositor and he has a cause of action against the bank and
its officers. 10 It is not enough that the officer knew that the bank was
The officers must have known or bein an embarrassed condition."
lieved that the bank was in an insolvent condition when the deposit
was received to constitute fraud so as to enable the depositor to recover. But where the bank's officer knew that the bank was failing,
or even in truth insolvent, and expected by their inducement to
strengthen the bank's condition, their action in receiving deposits is
2
not fraudulent and the deposits cannot be recovered.'
In Hinson v. Drummond 13 the President and director of bank represented to the depositor that the bank was in a sound condition and
solvent and thereby persuaded depositor to leave his money in the
bank, where the bank was insolvent and depositor lost deposit, the
court said, that if the president had no actual knowledge of the condition of bank, his situation was such that it was his duty to know
the truth or falsity of representation, and such party is in law guilty
of fraud as much as if he had actual knowledge.
7

Daniels v. Berry, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 422.

8

BANKS AND BANKING, 7 C.

J.

730.

9 In re Bank of Whitecastle, 119 So. 872 (La. 1929).
10 BANKS AND BANxING, 7 C. J. 730.
11
12

13

Quin v. Earle, 95 Fed. 728 (1899).
BANKS AND BANKING, 7 C. J. 730.
123 So. 913 (Fla. 1929) (see the court's syllabus).

NOTES
" 'Courts of equity,'" it is said, "'will not only interfere, in cases
of fraud, to set aside acts done, but they will also, if acts have, by
fraud, been prevented from being done by the parties, interfere, and
treat the case exactly as if the acts had been done.'" 14 However,
these principles have no application to a set of facts involving the mere
relation of creditor and debtor. The money deposited becomes the
property of the bank. In Venner v. Cox,15 a case decided in the Court
of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee, it was said, that where the depositor had demanded payment and upon the false representation that
the bank was solvent remained a creditor, he was not entitled to preference on the theory that deposits became impressed with trust in
favor of depositors because of fraud. "If such misrepresentations operate in equity to divest title of property, and to convert debtors into
trustees for their creditors, the field of trust estates will be immensely
enlarged. Such a principle would ultimately constitute a serious obstruction to trade and commerce." 16
The creditors have two remedies which they may enforce simultaneously when -the bank becomes insolvent. They may sue the bank
and have a receiver appointed for the collection of the assets and
application of them to the debts, and, at the same time, sue the stockholders on their statutory liability.17 "The liability of the stockholders
to the depositors is an individual liability to the depositors only, and
is not an asset bf the bank, the receiver having nothing to do with
it." 18
John F. Harrison.

EVIDENcE-ADmissABILITY OF AN ATHEIST'S DYING DECLARATION.
-The recent decision of Wright v. State,' handed down by the Alan
bama Court of Appeals, held the dying declaration of one who did
not believe in a Supreme Being, who did not believe there was a place
to reward the faithful or punish the wicked, to be admissable in evidence. Although there is nothing inharmonious with decisions of
other courts in this country, the dissenting opinion of one of the
learned justices, in its adherence to the old common law doctrine, presents a very interesting question for discussion.
It would not be totally without profit in consideration of this case
to give some attention to the history of dying declarations from their
14
15
16
17
18
1

Venner v. Cox, 35 S. W. 769, 770 (Tenn. 1895).
Op. cit. supra note 14.
Venner v. Cox, op. cit. supra note 14, at pp. 770, 771.
Ford v. Sauls, 136 S. E. 888 (S. C. 1927).
Ford v. Sauls, op. cit supra note 17, at p. 889.
136 So. 636 (Ala. 1931).
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advent into the legal machinery of meting out justice, down to the
present day tenets of our learned courts. To do this it is first necessary
that the definition and nature of an oath be propounded.
An oath is an appeal by a person to God to witness the truth of
what he declares, and an imprecation of Divine punishment or vengeance upon him if what he says is false. 2 Professor Wigmore, in
his treatise on "Evidence," says: "The theory of the oath in modem
common law may be termed a subjective one in contrast to the earlier
one, which may be termed objective. The oath is not a summoning
of Divine vengeance upon false swearing, whereby when the spectators see the witness standing unharmed, they know that the Divine
judgment has pronounced him to be a truth-teller. But it is a method
of reminding the witness strongly of the Divine punishment somewhere in store for false swearing, and thus of putting him in a frame of
mind calculated to speak only the truth as he saw it." 3 The learned
court in Clinton v. State 4 expresses it very well in saying: "The purpose of the oath is not to call the attention of God to the witness but
the attention of the witness to God; not call upon Him to punish the
false-swearer but on the witness to remember that He will surely do so.
By thus laying hold of the conscience of the witness and appealing to
his sense of accountability, the law best insures the utterance of truth."
From earliest times then it may be said that the essence of an oath
was a belief in God and in a state of future reward and punishment.
The original common law set forth the rule that in order to be a competent witness one must maintain such beliefs. What religious tenets
one adhered to was of no consequence but a belief in a Supreme Being
was essential. Lord Chief Justice Lee, in Omychund v. Barker,5 says:
"I agree . . . that where ... the witness is of a religion, it is sufficient;
for the foundation of all religion is the belief of a God. . . ." Martin,

B., in Miller v. Salomons,6 says: "The doctrine laid down by the
Lord Chancellor and all the other Judges [in Omyckund v. Barker,
supra] was, that the essence of an oath was an appeal to a Supreme
Being, in whose existence the person taking the oath believed, and
whom he also believed to be a rewarder of truth and an avenger of
falsehood . ..

."

Passing to the consideration of dying declarations, they are held
to be admissable in evidence in criminal prosecutions for homicide as
one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The theory upon which
they are admitted is that the situation of the declarant is regarded as
2
3
4

WEBsTERs DiCoNARY.
3 WiGmoRE ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1816.

33 Ohio St.. 33 (1877).

5 Lee, L. C. J., Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 46 (1744).
6

7 Exch. 475, 515 (1852).
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a substitute for an oath. It is presumed that they are made by one
who is in a condition so solemn and awful as to exclude the supposition that he could be influenced by malice, revenge or any conceivable
motive to speak anything except the truth. The ancient axiom was:
Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire.7 The great dramatist, Shakespeare, in depicting his character, Melun s expressed the common feeling long before it was sanctioned by judicial opinion. To quote the
language of Chief Baron Eyre in The King v. William Woodcock: 9
".. . the general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is, that they are declarations made in extremity when the party
is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone;
when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced
by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a situation
so solemn and so awful is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is created by a positive oath administered
in a court of justice." The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Hill v.
State,'0 went so far as to hold that such a declaration made under
sense of impending death is more liable to be true than the -testimony
of a witness given under oath, stating: "When dissolution is approaching and the dying man has lost all hope of life, and the shadows
of the grave are gathering -in around him, and his mind is impressed
with full sense of his condition, the solemnity of the scene and the
hour gives to his statement a sanctity of truth more impressive and
potential than the formalities of an oath."
As a further reason for the admission of dying declarations, it is
now universally held that such evidence is absolutely necessary. The
defendant who by his own act has put it out of the power of his
victim to appear in evidence against him, cannot justly complain of
the admission of the dying declarations of his victim without the
sanction of an oath or without his appearance in person as a witness
against him. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in the case of
State v. Ferguson,' says: "The principle on which deathbed declaraWiGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 1430, footnote 1.
King John, Act V, Scene 4; WiGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 1438,
footnote 1.
9 1 Leach 500, 502 (1789).
10 Hill v. State, 41 Ga. 484 (1871). Cf. People v. Kraft, 36 N. Y. S. 1034,
91 Hun. 474 (1896), wherein it was declared that the statements of a person
who is dying are not necessarily credible. See also Railing v. Commonwealth,
110 Pa. St. 100, 1 Atl. 314 (1885), as to the unsatisfactory nature of reasons
for admission.
11 2 Hill (S. C.) 624, 27 Am. Dec. 412 (1835). See, also, editorial note of
Chief Justice Redfield in 1 G=Nqi'Ar ox EViDENcE, 156. Accord: Mattox v.
United States, 146 U. S. 140 (1892); Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 198 (1869);
People v. Corey, 157 N. Y..332, 51 N. E. 1024 (1898); People v. Lonsdale, 122
Mich. 388, 81 N. W. 277 (1899); Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 617 (1857).
7

8
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tions are admitted is that of necessity. The assassin does not seek the
open day or the crowded thoroughfare to do his deed of darkness,
and it frequently happens that none but the victim witnesses the deed.
The sanction is that of approaching death. No one who has a proper
sense of religion or who believes in a future state of rewards and
punishments, would willingly incur the guilt of falsehood who had before him the immediate prospect of a final account for the deeds done
in the body when every thought, word, and deed of evil must rise up
for his condemnation."
Having set out the requisites which render a witness at common
law competent to take an oath and the reasons for the admission of
dying declarations, the question now presents itself: Is the dying
declaration of an atheist admissible in evidence? The fact that an
atheist at common law could not take an oath is not a matter subject
to dispute. An atheist is one who disbelieves or denies the existence
of God. The belief in God gives vitality to the oath. How then can
one who renounces the very foundation upon which an oath is based,
call upon God to witness the truth of what he declares and to impricate
His Divine vengeance upon him if what he says is false? Following
this reasoning the Supreme Court of Vermont, in Arnold v. Arnold,
said: "Atheists or those who do not believe in the existence of any
Supreme Moral Governor of the universe, cannot be sworn nor give
testimony in any judicial tribunal." 12
Generally speaking, dying declarations to be admissable in evidence
must have been made by one who if he had been called upon to give
testimony in court, would have possessed the requisite qualifications of
a witness.' 3 It was the rule of common law that persons who are
insensible to the obligations of an oath because of their want of religious belief, are incompetent to testify as witnesses, and it would
logically follow that dying declarations are inadmissable in evidence
where the declarant because of such rule would have been incompetent to testify as a witness. The Supreme Court of Mississippi
very expressly says in Lombeth v. State:14 "An oath derives the value
of its sanction from the religious sense of the party's accountability
to his Maker and the deep impression that he is soon to render Him
his final account. The danger of immediate and impending death
and the belief of the party therein, are by our law, considered equivalent to this sanction. It follows, as a necessary consequence of the
rule which admits dying declarations made under such circumstances,
that the law must presume them, in the absence of proof to the con12

13 Vt. 362 (1841).
People v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 434 (1874); Boyle v. State, 97 Ind. 322
(1884), judg. aff'd in 105 Ind. 469 (1885) ; People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 26 (1864).
14 23 Miss. 322 (1852).
13

NOTES
trary, to have been made under a solemn and religious sense of impending dissolution; that is under a serious sense that the party
would be soon called to account for the truth or falsehood of the
statements in the same manner as the law will presume in the absence
of proof to the reverse, that every witness placed upon the stand and
sworn to testify, believes in the existence of a God and a state of
accountability in the future for the commission of crimes perpetrated
here."
The common law rule is now practically abrogated by constitutional
or statutory provisions under which religious belief or the lack of it
has no bearing whatsoever on the competency of the witness. The
tendency of these modem constitutions and statutes is to abolish this
religious test of the common law under a constitutional provision that
civil or political rights shall not be affected by religious beliefs.
There is no denying that the moral efficacy of the oath has long
since ceased to be what it once was. The prevalent belief, in the days
when the Judicum Dei was no empty phrase, was that God would
strike the perjurer down before the multitude. The effect of the
modem oath is to remind the witness of inevitable Divine punishment at some future time. Its object is not to exclude any person
on account of his or her theological beliefs; its true purpose is not
to exclude any competent witness, but merely to add a stimulus to
truthfulness whenever such a stimulus is feasible.
In every jurisdiction there has been some legislation dealing with
the subject of oaths. Some of these provisions are inconsistent with
the old common law and set forth their own qualifications for the
competency of a witness, while others are merely declaratory of the
requirements as laid down in the common law. It would be profitless to attempt to analyze the precise state of the law in each jurisdiction, but with reference to the abolition and dispensation of the
oath, the condition in general is summarized as follows by Professor
Wigrore:
"(1)
In no jurisdiction has the use of the oath been abolished.
"(2)
In almost every jurisdiction, the rigor and injustice of the
common-law rule has been removed, for persons having an incompatible theological belief . . . ." 15
The modern legislators, considering the true purpose of the oath
to be a stimulus for the witness to tell the truth, have come gradually
to perceive that the use of the oath, not to increase testimonial
efficiency, but to exclude qualified witnesses, was not only an abuse of
its true principle, but also a practical injustice to suitors who need
1r) WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 1828.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
such testimony. Accordingly, it has now been legislated in all but a
few jurisdictions that those who lack the requisite belief or those who
may have the belief but are forbidden by conscientious scruples to
take an oath, may choose to make an affirmation of what he testifies to
be the truth instead of making an oath. Another source of relief
from the iron-clad qualifications of the common law doctrine has
been found under the constitutional provisions guaranteeing that theological belief shall not effect one's civil capacities.' G The various
States in the formation of their "Bills of Rights" and in interpreting
the Constitution of the United States granting, "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" to its citizens, have enacted laws to the effect that
one's political and religious belief are personal and not subject to be
questioned. The result of this legislation has been to allow the administration of the oath to persons who lack the common law belief.
In conclusion it might be said that while it has not been the object
of statutory legislation to devitalize the oath, it has, at least, robbed
it of its moral efficacy and substituted for witnesses who lack the
theological belief requisite at common law what might be termed an
empty formula. The reasoning and policy of these statutes is based
on the interference with one's civil capacities, and the possibility of
injustice being wrought upon a litigant due to the exclusion of evidence necessary to prove or defend the cause.
Leo Hodel.

TORRENS

SYSTEM

OF TITLE

REGISTRATIoN.-Speaking

broadly,

there are three various systems of dealing with transfers of real estate.
The first is that in use prior to the passage of the English statute of
Frauds in 1677-conveyancing without any pretense of public registration. Livery of seisin was the mode of conveyance; actual delivery
of a part of the realty as an indication of delivery, by symbol and
performed in the presence of witnesses, of the whole estate. Although
satisfactory at that remote and retarded age it would be supremely
insufficient today. Following the rise of England out of the seclusion
of the feudal period and the passage of the various statutes in response
to the crying need of the people for a better system of conveyancing,
a second system grew up.'
It was that of registering of the instruments or documents of title
to real estate, so that a public record was formed, doing away with
16

Bush v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 244 (1882); Hroneck v. People, 134

Ill. 139, 24 N. E. 861 (1890); Hood v. State, 59 S. E. 971 (W. Va. 1907).
1 See Alfred G. Reeves, Progress in Land Title Transfers; the New Registration Law of New York (1908) 8 CoT. L. REv. 438, 439.
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livery of seisin, and at the same time following the statutes. Naturally the English common law became rooted into the new soil
of the colonies, and after the break with the mother country it was
far too efficient and too firmly rooted to replace. As a consequence
this is the system generally followed in the various jurisdictions of the
United States.2 It has been reasonably safe and convenient for many
years, as was livery of seisin during the period of the middle ages,
when needs were thus adequately served. That day was outgrown and
a different, and more efficient system placed in operation. It seems
reasonable to suppose that some day our present system will be superceded by one more responsive to the more complex needs of our involved civilization. This second system, like all man-made devices,
is subject to faults, among these the danger and difficulty of unrecorded
liens, generality of judgment liens, unknown dower rights, and other
defects in suits, and their preliminary matter, over real estate.
The two vital defects of the present system, first the time and
expense of re-examination of title whenever it is to be passed or encumbered. The second is the growing volume of public records. This
may appear a rather futile argument, but we will see a little later that
there is a practical solution for it, should it become a pressing problem.
In this day when every saving possible both of time and expense, is
so eagerly sought, it is most impractical, not to say wasteful, to examine
and re-examine title to a particular piece of land over a period, possibly
compassing a hundred or more years.
The third system of conveyancing is devised for official registration
of the title of the land itself. Perhaps better known as the Torrens
system of title registration, it was first introduced and advocated
among English-speaking peoples by Sir Robert Richard Torrens, an
Irish immigrant to Australia in 1840, who later became the first
premier of South Australia, where he introduced the system into successful operation in 1858. From there it has spread over all of Australasia, South Africa, much of Canada, and, by Lord Cairn's Act of
1875, to the county of London. It is said that Sir Robert conceived
the idea of his scheme of registration while acting as collector of the
customs at the port of Adelaide, making the system analogous to the
method of registering ownership of vessels. It seems more probable
that he had heard of the system as it was practiced among Germanic
peoples, since the first record of such a transaction as this system
contemplated was found in Vienna, dated as of the year 1369. Subsequently it was employed at various times up to 1880 in various
towns and cities of Germany and Austro-Hungary. In 1900 the German Civil Code made title registration compulsory, and it is now
2

Op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 441.
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achieved through judicial proceedings there as well as in AustroHungary, Prussia, and some of the Swiss Cantons.
As stated by Sir Robert, "The fundamental principle is to establish
and certify to ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to real
property, without requiring any judicial proceeding for that purpose,
and to simplify and expedite transfer of such property." Here is
the fundamental difference between the English system and the systems
put into effect by the statutes of the various states of the United
States. The English system does away with the necessity of a judicial
proceeding. Our statutes may not do this, because of the provision of
the due process clause of the Fifth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. This point has been the source of some misunderstanding, which should disappear upon a comprehension of the
original system, as practiced in Germany much earlier than the English
system, where the nucleus of the whole matter was a judicial proI
ceeding.
Now for a brief sketch of the system itself. To bring one's land
under the act, the owner of the fee or of an interest therein must
apply to a court designated under the statute, which court has power
to inquire into the state of the title and may make any decrees
necessary to determine title against all persons, upon proper proceedings being taken. The application is then referred to an examiner of
titles, who proceeds to determine whether the applicant has a merchantable title to the land. When his report is filed the clerk, by
order of the court issues summons, naming the applicant as plaintiff,
to all persons having an interest in or claim to the land. These must
be directed to known defendants by name, directing them to answer
with-in a specified time, and service must be made in regular fashion,
but service by publication is perfectly permissible as against persons
unknown as defendants. All defendants may appear and answer; if
none do so, the court may enter a default, but the plaintiff must prove
his title, the court not being bound by the report of the examiner but
being able to require further proof. If the court finds the applicant's
title good then a decree confirming title and ordering registration is
made, which is binding and conclusive on all persons, whether mentioned by name or coming under the head of unknown defendants and
served by publication. Title is thereby quieted in the owner. A certified copy of the decree is filed with the registrar of titles who proceeds to register the title as directed by the decree, by making an
entry of an original certificate in the files and presenting the owner
with a duplicate.
Now there is only one way in which the owner may transfer property in this real estate. This is by going to the registrar with the pur-

NOTES
chaser (either of these parties may be represented by authorized
agents) and surrendering the old duplicate to the registrar, who enters
a new certificate in the file in the name of the new owner, and gives
him a new certificate in duplicate of the one on file. Many of the
states retain the deed, but it has become practically inoperative as a
conveyance even after proper execution. The advantage of this type
of conveyancing is manifest. It is quick, easy, safe, and inexpensive.
The record books grow only when a track hitherto entered under one
certificate is divided, so that the divisions each command one entry.
Under our system each transaction since the beginning of occupation
is recorded and preserved. While there is no immediate danger of
the records crowding area necessary to population, still the problem
of finding these early records is real, commanding time and creating
expense. Under the Torrens system, a transfer, once the land is under
the act, calls for no examination of title and may be wholly consumated
in a short time and at little cost.
The register deals with the legal title exclusively and only legal
claims against the land, estates less that fee simple are entered on the
certificate, but one holding an equity may protect it by entering of a
caveat on the certificate. A subsequent buyer now takes with notice of
these outstanding interests. The statutes also provide for the entry on
the certificate of memorials of subsequent transfers, liens or adverse
claims, which protects the adverse interest of such claimant, and is notice to any purchaser. One being omitted from registration proceedings
may show his right to an interest and file this as a memorial.
Now let us list a few of the advantages of such a system. It does
away with voluminous records and difficult indexes, one of the great
defects of the present system. It makes for a convenient way of clearing a title of mechanical imperfections by the judicial procedure necessary to place land under the act. Most of the statutes provide for an
assurance fund from which one who had an interest in, or a claim
against land whose rights have been destroyed by the decree, any
person who incurs loss, damage or deprivation through any omission
or mistake of a registrar, examiner of title or other employee in the
performance of their duties under the statute, may be compensated.
This fund is made up from a tax placed on the operation of transfer.
The system is simple, because there is only one entry for each parcel
of land; safe, because the system of duplication militates against loss
by fire, and very probably will be less expensive in operation than our
present system. The expense to the transferor and transferee will most
certainly be reduced, since no abstracts need be examined and corrected.
There is only one complete examination of title, at the time the property goes under the act. It does not do away with fraud but renders
it more difficult by requiring a surrender of the former certificate and

